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Abstract  
Kenya’s December 2007 Presidential elections sparked a wave of violent clashes over 
allegations of election rigging. The protests broke out along ethnic lines, causing greater 
civil unrest. There have been allegations that during these outbreaks of violence crimes 
against humanity were committed. This violence attracted world-wide concern and was 
universally condemned. Kenya is loathe to prosecute the perpetrators or those who bear 
the highest responsibility for the alleged commission of crimes against humanity. It has 
instead established a national investigatory mechanism, the Kenyan Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TJRC). This approach adopted by Kenya has been 
criticized for the fact that it fosters a culture of impunity. However, the Prosecutor of 
International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC) has used his proprio motu powers to initiate 
an investigation of alleged commission of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
This research paper has analysed  the reasons for the proprio motu intervention of the 
ICC in Kenyan situation. It also examined whether Kenya was unwilling or genuinely 
unable to prosecute the perpetrators of the post-election violence of 2007. Furthermore, 
the paper evaluated the provisions of the Kenyan TJRC, the major shortcomings of the 
Commission and the challenges it is facing in fulfilling its mandate.  In conclusion the 
paper analysed the relationship between TJRC and ICC and re-evaluate any role that the 
two bodies could play in dispensing justice in Kenya. But before that, the paper laid down 
the factual background that led to the proprio motu interevention of the ICC in Kenya 
where a truth commission had alreday been established. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1   Introduction to the study 
At the end of December 2007, widespread violence broke out in Kenya over 
allegations of election rigging following the announcement of the results of 
presidential elections held on 27 December 2007. The protests erupted along ethnic 
lines, causing great civil unrest and brutal killings. About 1300 people were killed 
and thousands were injured. Some areas suffered massive destruction of property, 
resulting in 300000 people being displaced from their homes. Some 322 women and 
girls sought hospital treatment for sexual assaults during this period, despite a 
general reluctance on their part to report these to the police and also because too 
many victims were displaced
1
  
Since then debate has been raging in Kenya on what should be done, and what forms 
of accountability should be imposed on those responsible for the alleged crimes of 
humanity committed during the post-election violence. The options which were 
available to Kenya included establishing a special criminal tribunal, setting up a 
dedicated division of the Kenyan High Court to try specific crimes, referring 
suspects to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, or utilizing the 
country’s ordinary criminal courts, together with the TJRC. Despite calls for an 
approach that combines both international and domestic justice mechanisms, the 
government is inclined towards adopting purely local options.  
                                                            
1 These figures have been extracted from the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights 
Report (OHCHR) Fact Finding Mission to Kenya, 6 to28 February 2008, 25. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Owing to the lack of progress, the Prosecutor of the Court (ICC) Louis Ocampo, 
took the matter to the pre-trial chamber of the ICC, seeking its permission to start 
investigations in Kenya.
2
 Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber II on 31 March 2010 
in its judgment gave the prosecutor permission to lodge an investigation of the 
Kenyan situation.
3
 
In late October 2008, the Kenyan Parliament unanimously passed into law the bill 
for creating the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to investigate 
and recommend appropriate action regarding abuses committed between the 
country’s independence on 12 December 1963 and on the conclusion of the power-
sharing deal of 28 February 2008.
4
 The President, Mwai Kibaki assented to the bill 
on 28 November 2008. 
2.  Research questions 
Was the Kenyan Government unwilling or unable to prosecute those who bear the 
highest criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity committed during the 
post election violence in order for the ICC prosecutor to use his proprio motu powers 
in Kenya? This is one question which this research paper attempts to answer. 
The paper also seeks to answer whether the Kenyan situation was admissible before 
the ICC, knowing that Kenya had established the TJRC as the national process. 
Another question which this paper seeks to answer is whether the Kenyan TJRC will 
contribute to the healing and reconciliation process in Kenya significantly? 
                                                            
2See “Kenya deliver justice for victims of postelection violence”.  
3 See the ICC Judgment No ICC-01/09-19 dated 31 March 2010. 
4 See sec. 5(a) of the TJRC Act No 6 of 2008 Laws of Kenya. 
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In addition, the paper will attempt to study if the  ICC and the Truth Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) will have any role in dispensing justice in 
transitional Kenya.  
3.   Significance of the study 
This research paper will be useful in establishing whether in establishing the TJRC 
in place of a Special Tribunal which would offer retributive justice; the Kenyan 
government was unwilling or unable to prosecute those who bear the highest 
criminal responsibility or whether the establishment of the TJRC was the best 
available option for the victims of the post election violence of 2007. To this end, the 
study will also study the TJRC with the aim of determining whether it meets 
internationally acceptable standards of Truth  Commissions by drawing from some 
of the Truth Commissions which have existed in history.
5
   
This study also seeks to analyse any role the TJRC and ICC will play in the present 
transitional period in Kenya. This work will therefore help to contribute to the 
argument that a truth commission may contribute to the healing and reconciliation 
process in Kenya significantly, and that the ICC is important in ending the culture of 
impunity. 
 Kenyan scenario provides an opportunity in history for the ICC to work 
simultaneously with a TJRC. This paper therefore studies the role of a truth 
commission in situations where the ICC has been involved. The study will also be be 
important in establishing the applicability of the principles of complementarity and 
                                                            
5 From 1974 t0 2010 there have been 40 truth commissions set up across the world. Some of these 
commissions includes; the El-Salvador Truth Commission, The Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, The 
Clarification Commission in Guatemala, the Chile National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 
The Rwanda Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
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the working relationship of both the ICC and the TJRC. The Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC defines complementarity in the form of admissibility 
requirements.
6
 Complementarity principle basically means that the state party  to the 
ICC has the primary duty to prosecute international crimes committed within its 
territory, and the ICC will only act if the state party fails to prosecute the  
perpetrators of the international crimes committed within its territory. 
4. Methodological approach 
This research paper will draw on primary sources such as the international law 
instruments, national statutes, national and international reports and case law 
emanating from international and domestic jurisdiction. The secondary sources will 
comprise books, law journal articles, and electronic sources. At a practical level, the 
study will rely on the recent developments in Kenya. To this end, the study will use 
print media especially newspapers. 
5.   Scope 
Chapter one introduces the study, its significance, research problem, approach and 
scope. Chapter two will briefly outline the historical background of the research 
topic by inter alia discussing briefly the violence that erupted following the 
announcement of the presidential results, the process and signing of the power-
sharing coalition government agreement that led to the establishment of the TJRC 
and briefly discuss the intervention of the ICC in Kenyan situation. 
Chapter three gives a general description of the Kenyan truth commission. It will 
analyse the TJRC with specific reference to its structure, mandate, proceedings, and 
it investigative methods, which form the backbone of a truth commission.  
                                                            
6 See the Preamble and Article 1 and Articles 17 of the ICC Statute. 
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Chapter four will study Article 15, 17 and 20 of the Rome Statute in order to 
establish the the reasons that necessitated the ICC  prosecutor to use his proprio 
motu  powers  in Kenyan situation. This will be important in establishing whether the 
Kenyan government was unwilling or genuinely unable to prosecute those who bear 
the highest criminal responsibility for the international crimes committed in its 
territory.  
Chapter five will conclude the research paper by determining whether or not the 
Kenyan TJRC is appropriate for addressing international crimes committed during 
the post-election violence, and any role the ICC and the TJRC could have in 
dispensing justice in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE INTERVENTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
KENYAN TRUTH COMMISSION 
Kenya gained independence from Britain in June 1963 with Mzee Jomo Kenyatta as 
its first President. Kenyatta, who died in 1978, was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi 
as the second president who held office until 2002 when he was succeeded by the 
incumbent President, Mwai Kibaki.
 7
 
2.1 Election violence in Kenya: A brief outline of post independent Kenya 
Since gaining independence in 1963, Kenya’s political history has been marked by 
violent uprisings and repression. When Kenya African National Union (KANU) won 
the 1963 elections, the country became a de facto one-party state, with President 
Kenyatta banning attempts to create any opposition party.
8
 When President Moi took 
office in 1978, he pursued policies of political repression which included excessive 
use of force, torture, indefinite detention, and other measures against his political 
opponents.
9
 
He was elected unopposed in three consecutive elections held in 1979, 1983 and 
1988 all of which were held under the single party constitution.
10
The 1988 election 
resulted in the advent of the mlolongo (queuing) voting system, where voters had to 
line up behind their favoured candidates instead of voting through secret ballots.
11
 
This was seen as the climax of a very undemocratic regime and it led to widespread 
agitation for constitutional reform.
 
Only after intense donor pressure did President 
                                                            
7 See, “Kenyan  political history.” 
8 See Obel (2009:3). 
9 See, Human Rights Watch, (1993:8).  See also Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (hereafter  Waki Report), (2008: 24). 
10 See, “Kenya Timeline: A timeline overview of big and small events in the history of Kenya” . 
11 B. Harden  (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Moi allow the change of the constitution and multi-party elections in 1992. These 
first multi-party elections were characterised by threats, harassments and the 
occurrence of violent clashes between supporters of different parties, leading to a 
loss of 1500 Kenyan lives and displacing more than 300 000 people.
12
 Moi managed 
to maintain power in the elections and continued to repress political opposition.
13
 
The next elections were held in 1997 and were associated with violence as well 
which started six months before the actual voting took place,  causing the death of 
more than 100 and leading to the displacement of more than 100 000.
14
  
In 2002, Moi was constitutionally barred from running for presidency again. He 
appointed Uhuru Kenyatta (Jomo Kenyatta’s son) as the KANU’s candidate.  Mwai 
Kibaki was running for the Presidency under the opposition coalition the, "National 
Rainbow Coalition" (NARC), and he won the elections.  
These elections were not characterised by any form of violence and were judged free 
and fair by local and international observers, marking a turning point in Kenya's 
democratic evolution.
15
  
2.2 The 2007 elections in Kenya 
Kenya has maintained considerable political, economical and social stability despite 
changes in its political system and crises erupting in neighbouring countries. But at 
the end of December 2007, widespread violence broke out in Kenya over allegations 
of election rigging, following the announcement of the results of presidential 
elections held on 27 December 2007. About 1300 people were killed and thousands 
were injured. Some areas suffered massive destruction of property and 650 000 
                                                            
12 Human Rights Watch, (2002:27).  
13 See,“Kenya timeline: A timeline overview of big and small events in the history of Kenya”. 
14 Human Rights Watch (2002:35). 
15 Anderson (2003: 331). 
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people were displaced from their homes. Some 322 women and girls sought hospital 
treatment for sexual assaults during this period.
 16
 There have been allegations that 
during these outbreaks of violence crimes against humanity were committed. This 
violence attracted world-wide concern and was universally condemned. 
 
Ten million Kenyan citizens had gone to the polls on 27 December 2007 in what was 
generally anticipated to be the most hotly contested and closely run presidential, 
parliamentary and civic elections in the country’s 45 years since emerging from 
British colonial rule.
17
 In the elections, President Kibaki campaigning under the 
banner of the Party of National Unity, ran for re-election against Raila Odinga, the 
leader of the main opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). 
 
The Electoral Commission declared Kibaki the winner on the evening of 30 
December 2008, placing him ahead of Odinga by about 232 000 votes. 
18
Following 
the Commission's declaration of his victory, President Kibaki was promptly sworn in 
for his second term late in the evening on the same day, calling for the "verdict of the 
people" to be respected and for "healing and reconciliation" to begin.
19
 
 
Within minutes of the Commission's declaration of Kibaki as victor, inter-tribal 
rioting and violence broke out across Kenya.
20
 In his New Year speech President 
Kibaki emphasised the importance of peace, stability, and tolerance and declared the 
election as a concluded event warning that law-breakers would be punished.
21
 
                                                            
16 These figures have been extracted from the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights 
Report (OHCHR) Fact Finding Mission to Kenya, 6 to28 February 2008, 25. 
17 See Report of the Independent Review Commission (IREC), (commonly called the Kriegler Report) 
handed in to the President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga on 17 September 2008, 154. 
18 Crummen (2007). 
19 Crummen (2007). 
20 Kinuthia (2007). 
21 Mwangi (2008). 
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Similarly, in his speech, Odinga stated that he was unwilling to negotiate with 
President Kibaki as he did not acknowledge Kibaki’s legitimacy.22 
 
On 5 January 2008, Kibaki met the United States of America (USA) Assistant 
Secretary of State; Jendayi Frazer, where-after he stated that he was willing to form a 
government of national unity.  But Odinga, who also met with Frazer, rejected this 
proposal and called for the creation of a transitional government under which new 
elections would be held in three to six months.
23
However, Odinga met with Frazer 
for a second time and shortly afterwards, Odinga's spokesman said that the ODM 
would not demand that Kibaki resign or admit defeat if he accepted an international 
mediator. 
24
 
2.3 Negotiations on the signing of peace accord 
2.3.1 John Kufuor mediation 
The mediation process, facilitated by Ghanaian President and African Union 
Chairman, John Kufuor, began, on 9 January 2008 with President Kufuor meeting 
separately with Kibaki and Odinga.
25
 Government statements on that day 
emphasised Kibaki's commitment to dialogue and said that he had "already initiated 
a process of dialogue with other Kenyan leaders". Kibaki also gave a speech in 
which he said that the election was concluded, that it was impossible to change the 
outcome, and that any complaints should be handled through the courts.
26
 Both 
Odinga and Kibaki  agreed to "an immediate cessation of violence as well as any acts 
which may be detrimental to finding a peaceful solution to the ongoing crisis", but 
the talks otherwise failed when; President Kibaki refused to sign an agreement 
                                                            
22 Mwangi (2008). 
23 Hull and Moody (2008). 
24 Dixon (2008). 
25 Kanina and Miriri (2008). 
26 Kanina and Miriri (2008). 
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(which was already signed by ODM representatives) presented to him by Kufuor.
27
  
The agreement would have provided for an interim coalition government and an 
inquiry into the Electoral Commission. The government blamed Odinga for the 
failure of the talks, saying that he was not responsive to Kibaki's offer of dialogue.
28
 
On his departure on 10 January 2008, Kufuor stated that both parties had agreed to 
continue talks together with former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
and "a panel of eminent African personalities".
29
 
2.3.2 Beginning of peace negotiations 
On 24
 
January 2008, negotiations between the incumbent and opposition parties 
brokered by the African Union's Panel of Eminent African Personalities and former 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, were initiated by Annan meeting Kibaki and 
Odinga, who met for the first time since the crisis began in Annan’s presence.30 
Annan termed the meeting as very encouraging, as it had represented the first steps 
towards a peaceful solution of the problem. Annan called on both sides to designate 
negotiators by 29 January 2008.
31
Both President Kibaki and Odinga stated after the 
meeting that they were working for a solution and urged the people to be peaceful.
32
  
Peace talks began on 29 January 2008, with Annan calling for an end to the 
violence.
33
  Annan anticipated that resolution of short-term issues could occur in four 
weeks, although he thought deeper talks could continue for a year.
34
 
                                                            
27 Khan (2008). 
28 Khan (2008). 
29 Khan (2008). 
30 Associated Press (CBS News), (2008, 15 January) 
31 Reuters (2008, 28 January). 
32 Reuters (2008, 28 January). 
33 CNN (2008, 29 January). 
34 BBC News (2008, 1 February). 
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By 1 February 2008, the two rival leaders had agreed on an agenda for peace talks, 
which would include the topics of ending the violence, the humanitarian situation, 
resolving the political crisis, and land and historical injustices. To this end an 
agreement had been reached on 18 measures that would end the violence, including 
the demobilization of gangs and ceasing speeches and text messages that incited 
hatred and violence.
35
 But the Violence continued.
36
  
By 7 February 2008, the two sides had remained deeply divided in talks, although 
they had agreed that there would be no recount of votes. Annan had emphasised that 
he was totally opposed to a re-election in that climate, referring to the persistent 
violence. Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council called for peaceful 
resolution of the dispute through negotiations.
37
 
Progress in the talks was reported on February 8 2008, when Annan announced that 
both sides had agreed on the need for a political settlement
 
and that he hoped that 
talks on the resolution of the political crisis could be concluded earlier.
38
 
Despite the reported progress and his earlier adoption of a more conciliatory tone, 
Odinga returned to a hard-line stance on 9 February 2008 by repeating his earlier 
demand that President Kibaki should either resign or hold a new election and 
stressed that he would not compromise on that point.
39
 However, negotiations 
continued and on 12 February 2008 Annan stated that both sides in the talks had 
agreed to set up an independent review committee that would be mandated to 
investigate all aspects of the 2007 presidential election. He also asked both sides in 
                                                            
35 BBC News ( 2008, 1 February).  
36 BBC News ( 2008, 2 February). 
37 Al Jazeera  (2008, 3 February). 
38 BBC News ( 2008, 9 February). 
39BBC News ( 2008, 12 February). 
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the National Assembly to work together in passing legislation that was needed in 
resolving the crisis.
40
  
On 15 February 2008, the two sides agreed to a range of reforms, including the 
improvement of electoral laws and the upholding of human rights, as well as a 
review of the constitution. This was even before agreeing on the composition of a 
power-sharing government. The government wanted Kibaki to retain strong 
executive powers, while the opposition wanted Odinga to have extensive powers in a 
new position of Prime Minister. According to Annan, they were about to take "the 
last difficult and frightening step"  which was  to conclude a deal, and he said that he 
intended to remain in Kenya until a new government was in place, by which time he 
thought the process would be "irreversible". The commission charged with 
reviewing the election was to be established by 15 March 2008, with a report to 
follow within three to six months.
41
 
The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Kenya to support the talks 
on 18 February 2008. Rice met with Kibaki, Odinga, and Annan, and she 
emphasised the importance of reaching a settlement.
42
 
On 25 February 2008 both parties agreed to the creation of the post of prime minister 
but reached a deadlock when they disagreed about the powers the newly created post 
would have, over government posts and over a possible election in case the coalition 
should split. The talks were suspended on 26 February 2008 and Annan announced 
                                                            
40 Ron (2008). 
41 Al Jazeera (2008, 15 February). 
42 Khan (2008). 
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that they had not broken down but that the leaders needed to become directly 
engaged in the talks. 
43
 
Eventually, on 28 February 2008, President Kibaki and Odinga signed the agreement 
meant to end the crisis at a ceremony in Nairobi.
44
 Annan said that the agreement 
was to be known as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act.
45
 The two leaders 
agreed to form a coalition government, with Odinga set to receive the new position 
of Prime Minister, in which capacity he was to coordinate and supervise government 
affairs. The agreement also provided for two Deputy Prime Ministers, one for each 
of the two parties, while the allotment of Cabinet portfolios was to reflect the relative 
strength of the respective parties in the National Assembly. Thereafter, President 
Kibaki quickly reconvened the National Assembly on 6 March 2008 so that it could 
make the necessary constitutional changes in implementing the agreement.
46
  
The process also produced agreements to establish several commissions of inquiry, 
including the Commission of Inquiry on Post-election Violence, the Independent 
Review Commission on the Elections, a National Ethnic and Race Relations 
Commission, and the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission.
47
 
2.3.3 Implementation of the peace accord 
In pursuance of Agenda Four of the Agreement, two commissions were formed. One 
of them, the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections (commonly 
called the Kreglier Commission, named after the former South African 
Constitutional Court Judge who chaired it), found in its September 2008 report that 
                                                            
43 BBC News (2008, 18 February). 
44 Kenneth (2008).  
45 Kenneth (2008). 
46 BBC News (2008, 28 February).   
47 See the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, Government 
Printers, Nairobi. 
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politicians on all sides incited violence and that neither party had won the elections 
as both parties were involved in massive rigging. It recommended the disbandment 
of the Electoral Commission of Kenya and a creation of a new voters’ register.48  
The second commission, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(also called the Waki Commission, named after Kenyan Court of Appeal Judge who 
chaired it), issued its report shortly after the first commission. The Waki 
Commission recommended the creation of a special tribunal which would try key 
suspects for international crimes linked to the violence.
49
 The relevant 
recommendation was as follows: 
A special tribunal, to be known as the Special Tribunal for 
Kenya be set up as a court that will sit within the territorial 
boundaries of the Republic of Kenya and seek accountability 
against persons bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes, 
particularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 
general elections in Kenya. The Special Tribunal shall achieve 
this through the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of 
such crimes.
50
 
 
The Commission also submitted, confidentially, to Kofi Annan the names of 
individuals who bore the highest criminal responsibility for the alleged crimes 
against humanity committed during the post-election violence and recommended that 
if for whatever reasons Kenya was not able to prosecute the said masterminds, the 
list would be forwarded to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
                                                            
48  Kriegler Report, 67. 
49 Waki Report, 88. 
50 Waki Report 87. 
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with a view that the ICC would proceed to investigate and prosecute the said 
suspects. 
51
 
This commission’s report contained a strict timeline for setting up the tribunal and 
putting it to work, which, if breached, would require the mediator Kofi Annan to 
pass the sealed envelope with the names of the listed masterminds to the ICC 
Prosecutor. 
2.4 The options available to Kenya in dealing with perpetrators of post-election 
violence 
Since the publication of the Waki Report, debate has been raging in Kenya on what 
should be done, and what forms of accountability should be imposed on those 
responsible for the alleged crimes of humanity committed during the post-election 
violence. 
 
Kenya has therefore been faced with an option of either prosecuting those 
responsible for international crimes or referring the situation to the ICC as it is a 
state party to the Rome Statute. However, Kenya did not have any laws that would 
have enabled it to prosecute international crimes effectively, since it has yet to 
incorporate the ICC Statute into its legal system.  
 
The Kenyan Penal Code,
52
 which lays down offences under Kenyan law and also 
provides for the punishment for each offence, does not contain any provisions that 
define or provide for penalties for international crimes. The only exception is the 
Geneva Conventions Act 
53
 which incorporates into Kenyan law certain provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions, specifically the criminalization and punishment of grave 
                                                            
51 Waki Report 87. 
52 Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya. 
53 Chapter 198 Laws of Kenya. 
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breaches.
54
 However, this latter Act would not have been relevant in the context of 
the 2007 post-election violence because the offences in question were not committed 
in the context of an international armed conflict and, therefore, would not per se 
qualify as grave breaches.
55
 
 
In the light of the foregoing limitations it is very important to enact appropriate laws 
which would allow for the prosecution of the suspects of the crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Kenya.  
2.4.1 The Special Tribunal for Kenya 
On 16 December 2008, the grand coalition Government signed an agreement for full 
implementation of the Waki Report. As regards the establishment of the Special 
Tribunal, this required two pieces of legislation.  First a bill entitled ‘The Special 
Tribunal for Kenya Bill’ (‘Draft Statute’) was drafted.56 The Draft Statute sets out 
the crimes within the tribunal’s jurisdiction and defines its structure and 
competencies.
57
 Second, a Constitutional Amendment Bill which would ensure that 
the Special Tribunal would be in conformity with the Kenyan Constitution was 
tabled.
58
 
 
While the Waki Report had determined that the crimes committed in the post- 
election violence could amount to crimes against humanity, the Draft Statute did not 
limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction to only this category of crimes, but mandated it to 
prosecute for genocide, gross violations of human rights and other crimes committed 
                                                            
54 Section 3 of the Geneva Conventions Act. 
55 Okuta (2009:1064). 
56 Okuta (2009:1065). 
57 See, Draft Statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya. 
58 Draft Statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya.  
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in relation to the 2007 general elections.
59
 The tribunal was given exclusive 
jurisdiction to investigate these crimes and was to have primacy over the local courts 
for the crimes under its jurisdiction.
60
 
The Special Tribunal was to consist of a Trial Chamber and an Appeals Chamber, 
the Prosecutor, a Registry, the Defence office and the courts of Special Magistrates. 
The Trial Chamber was to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for the 
crimes while the Special Magistrates were to deal with the other offenders, as well as 
with other crimes committed during the post-election violence but which did not 
amount to international crimes.
61
 
 
When the Constitutional Amendment Bill was introduced into Parliament the 
parliamentarians rejected and voted against it on 12 February 2009. This effectively 
blocked any amendment to the Constitution and, therefore, the establishment of the 
Special Tribunal for Kenya.     
 
The Waki Commission had set a deadline of 30 January 2009 for passing the 
legislation, but on 24 February 2009, Annan granted the government of Kenya three 
more months to re-introduce the bills. 
62
 
 
On 3 July 2009, the Government sent a delegation to the ICC to discuss the Kenyan 
situation with the ICC Prosecutor. It was agreed that if there were no modalities put 
in place within 12 months for the prosecution of those responsible for the 2007 post-
                                                            
59 Sec. 4(1) and 8(1) of the Draft Statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya,  provided that the 
Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction was to cover the periods between 3 December 2007 and 28 February 
2008.  
60 Sec. 7 (1) and (2), of the Draft Statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya. 
61 Sec. 8 of Draft Statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya. 
62 Okuta(2009:1066). 
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election violence, the Kenyan Government would refer the matter to the ICC in 
accordance with Article 14 of the ICC Statute.
63
  
 
With pressure mounting, the Government had to move fast and provide guidance on 
the way forward. Cabinet papers called for support of the local tribunal on the 
ground that it would impart public confidence and enhance the competence of the 
local institutions. Further, unlike the ICC, if the matter were referred to this court, 
which would deal with only those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes, 
the Special Tribunal would deal with everyone, including those who had committed 
less grave crimes, through the courts of the Special Magistrates. It was also 
acknowledged that prosecution at the ICC would damage Kenya’s credibility 
internationally and undermine its international influence. Despite these arguments, 
no support or acceptance of the Draft Statute and the Constitutional Amendment Bill 
was forthcoming from the Cabinet or other parliamentarians.
64
  
 
On 31 July 2009, after a series of Cabinet meetings the Government announced that 
the suspects would be dealt with through the local courts and the Truth Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter TJRC). The idea to establish a Special 
Tribunal was therefore put to oblivion. In fact in late October 2008, the Kenyan 
Parliament unanimously passed into law the bill for creating the TJRC with the 
mandate of investigating and recommending appropriate action regarding abuses 
committed between the country’s independence on 12 December 1963 and on the 
                                                            
63 The agreed minutes between the ICC Prosecutor and the Kenyan Government.  
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conclusion of the power-sharing deal of 28
 
February 2008.
65
 President Kibaki 
assented the bill on 28 November 2008.
66
 
Efforts for creating the Special Tribunal were reintroduced on 7 November 2009, 
when another bill was reintroduced to parliament by a private member. The Bill 
failed to win the support of the majority of MPs. This Bill had proposed that those 
who caused the chaos be punished locally while those who organised and financed 
the violence be tried at the ICC. 
Probably owing to the unwillingness of the State to prosecute the perpetrators, and 
frustrated by the lack of progress, Kofi Annan submitted the names of the 
masterminds (who had been named by the Waki report) of the violence to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC. 
67
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
65 Sec. 5(a) of the TJRC Act No 6 of 2008, Laws of Kenya. 
69  Korir (2008). 
67 See, “Kenya: deliver justice for victims of post-election violence.”  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE KENYAN TRUTH JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
3.0 Introduction 
Thomas Buergenthal has defined Truth commissions as fact-finding bodies set up for 
the specific purpose of investigating serious violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law committed in a country during a specific period of time, usually 
during an armed conflict or a particularly repressive regime.
68
 Similarly, Priscilla 
Hayner defines truth commissions as bodies set up to investigate a past history of 
violations of human rights in a particular country, which can include violations by 
the military or other government forces or by armed opposition forces.
69
 Therefore 
truth commissions are bodies charged with the task of finding out the nature of 
human rights violations during a certain period, causes and extent of such abuses and 
the antecedent factors. 
Following the signing of the power sharing agreement which created coalition 
government in Kenya several commissions of inquiry, including the TJRC were 
established.
70
 
This chapter studies the TJRC with special focus on its composition, mandate and 
provisions related to amnesty and reparations. This will be important in drawing 
conclusions as to whether the TJRC has meet the internationally required standards 
of a Truth Commission. This chapter will also compare the Kenyan TJRC with other 
truth commissions which have been formed in the world. 
                                                            
68  Buergenthal (2006:103). 
69 Hayner (1994:597). 
70 See, Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord of 2008. 
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3.1 Background of the Kenyan TJRC 
The idea of a truth commission was first recommended in August 2003, by the Task 
Force appointed in 17 April 2003 on the Establishment of a TJRC. It was  chaired by 
Prof Makau Mutua a distinguished Kenyan jurist and a Human Rights activists. In its 
report the Task Force  indicated that 90% of Kenyans wanted a TJRC established.
 71
 
 
The mandate of the Task Force was to find out if a truth commission was necessary 
for Kenya and if so, to make recommendations on the type of truth commission that 
ought to be established. The Task Force recommended the immediate establishment 
of a TJRC before June 2004, with specific powers, functions and mandate.
72
 
However, these recommendations were never implemented by the Government.
73
 It 
has been argued that the Government was not taking the creation of TJRC 
seriously.
74
 But it seems that there was no poilitical will. 
 
The violence that followed the 2007 elections again brought to the fore the need to 
address the deep-seated political, social and economic issues facing Kenya. As a 
result, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Peace Accord mediated by 
Kofi Annan and a Panel of Eminent Personalities, agreed on a number of reforms. 
Key among these were that  a TJRC be created through an Act of Parliament.
75
 
Pursuant to this agreement, in October 2008, the Kenyan Parliament unanimously 
passed into law the bill for the creation of the TJRC. President Kibaki signed the bill 
on 28 November 2008.
76
 
                                                            
71 See, Report of Task Force’s on establishment of Truth Commission. 
72 Report of Task Force’s on establishment of Truth Commission. 
73 See, “the memorandum on the proposed amendments to the TJRC Bill 2008.” 
74 See, “the TJRC proposed.” 
75 Hayner (1994:598). 
76 Mungai (2008). 
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3.2 Kenyan TJRC: Its specific Features 
3.2.1 Establishment of the Commission 
The TJRC was established by an Act of Parliament as Act No 6 of 2008 which came 
into force on 9 March 2009. The Commission headquarters are in Nairobi but it can 
hold its sittings at any other place in Kenya.
77
 
3.2.2 Composition of the Commission 
As a rule, Commissioners appointed to a truth commission are required to be highly 
credible persons and are often seen as representing the seriousness of the efforts of 
investigating the past which was characterised by human rights abuses.
78
 Thus the 
commissioners should not be persons already in a position with a high political 
profile.
79
 
  
Commissioners could be persons having competence as lawyers, social scientists, 
religious leaders, theologians, psychologists, medical practitioners, historians e.t.c 
This is important because the professional background of Commissioners of truth 
commissions can reflect the primary focus of a Commission’s work. For instance a 
Commission made up of lawyers will likely convey an implication of justice and a 
commission made up of religious leaders will possibly convey the  attempt to reach 
healing and forgiveness.
80
 
 
The TJRC Commissioners were selected by a Selection Panel
81
 which had advertised 
the positions of the Commissioners in local dailies.  The qualified candidates were 
                                                            
77 Sec. 4(1) of the TJRC Act. 
78 Hayner (2002: 216). 
79 Dumbuya (2003:20). 
80 Fullard and Rousseau (2008:216). 
81 The Selection Panel was inclusive and  made up of persons nominated by the Kenya Episcopal 
Conference, the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, the 
Hindu Council of Kenya, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, the Supreme Council of Kenya 
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interviewed and thereafter short listed the names of 15 potential Commissioners for 
Parliamentary approval that were later approved by Parliament in June 2009.
82
 
Subsequently the President was supposed to appoint nine commissioners for from 
that list.  He eventually appointed them in July 2009.
83
  
 
The nine Commissioners are from different professional backgrounds and 
nationalities. Six members are Kenyan citizens and three are foreigners (from 
Ethiopia, the United States of America and Zambia) nominated by the Panel of 
African Eminent Personalities. 
Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat the Commission’s Chairman is a career diplomat. He 
is a renowned peace negotiator who has expertise in conflict management, which 
made him serve as the special envoy to the Somalia peace talks. In addition, he was 
the Executive Director of the African Peace Forum and a permanent secretary in the 
Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
84
 
The Vice Chairperson of the commission Betty Murungi is a co-founder and 
executive director of the Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights, which 
supports innovative and rapid initiatives on women’s leadership in peace building 
and access to justice in Africa. She is an expert in international human rights and 
transitional justice and has worked for the International Criminal Court, the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission and the East African Centre for Constitutional Development in Uganda. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Muslims, the Law Society of Kenya, the Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers, the Central 
Organization of Trade Unions, the Kenya National Union of Teachers, the Association of Professional 
Societies of East Africa, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the Kenya Private Sector 
Alliance, the Federation of Kenya Employers, and the Kenya Medical Association. See section 9 of 
the TJRC Act. 
82  See, “Why Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat should quit for Kenya to attain truth, justice and 
reconciliation.” 
83 Kenya Gazette Notice No 8737, Vol 70 of 14 August 2009 and Vol 77 of 31 August 2009. 
84 See, “Seeking truth, justice and reconciliation in Kenya.” 
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She received the national honour of the Moran of the Order of the Burning Spear in 
December 2003 for her work in human rights.
85
 
Commissioner Margaret Shava, a lawyer, is the chairperson of Women in Law and 
Development in Africa and a peace builder with International Alert, an independent 
organisation working in over 20 countries and territories around the world.
86
 Other 
Commissioners are: Ahmed Sheikh Farah who is a retired military Officer, Tecla 
Namachanja a Human Rights Activists and Tom Ojienda who is a former Chair of 
the Law Society of Kenya and the former East Africa Law Society president. 
Ojienda has consulted for the Njonjo and the Ndung’u Land Commissions, which 
aim to establish more equitable land distribution and rights in Kenya and served on a 
national task force on HIV and Aids.
87
 
Foreign Commissioners are; Prof Ron Slye from Seattle University School of Law 
who served as a legal consultant to the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission from 1996 to 2000. The other two foreign appointees are Judge 
Gertrude Chawatama from Zambia and Berhanu Dinka from Ethiopia.
88
Chawatama 
is a High Court judge and served on a special commission of inquiry into torture 
claims made by apparent coup plotters in 1997. Dinka served as U.N. Special 
Representative for Burundi and is formerly the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative and Regional Humanitarian Adviser for the Great Lakes Region. He 
was also a former United Nations envoy for Ethiopia, but was recalled by Lieut. 
89
 
Over the years truth commissions have been appointed either by the executive arm of 
the government as happened in Panama, or the executive arm, together with the 
                                                            
85 See “Seeking truth, justice and reconciliation in Kenya.” 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 25 
legislative arm, as was the case in South Africa, or by the legislative arm alone, as 
was the case in Germany and Chile, or by the monarchy, as happened in Morocco.
90
  
A Commission appointed in any of these ways becomes a national commission. 
Commissioners may also be appointed by, or in coordination with or by a mix of 
international and national authorities as was the case  in Sierra Leone. Sometimes the 
Commission selection is preceded by a formal and independent nomination and 
selection process, as was the case in Timor-Leste. At times Commissioners are 
selected in accordance with explicit criteria and procedures set out in the Truth 
Commission mandate as was the case in Ghana.
 91 
 
The key lesson from past experience is that a commission will tend to enjoy greater 
public and international support where its members are selected through a broad 
process of consultation aimed at ensuring wide representation of ethnic, religious 
groups and gender.
92
 
Kenya has both national and international Commissioners. Having foreign members 
is an advantage as the foreign commissioners would bring in foreign expertise. 
Furthermore, the national commissioners have an understanding of history, social 
and political background of the country. This is commendable as it would enhance 
the legitimacy and credibility of the commission. Even though this might seem to be 
the case, the TJRC has recently faced a confidence crisis as the credibility of the 
                                                            
90 Freeman (2006:27). 
91  Freeman (2006:28), see also Buergenthal (1994:109) also Cassel (1993:18) and Tomuschat, 
(2001:236) where he has argued that the composition of a commission may vary greatly in terms of 
nationalities, profession and gender. For instance the commissioners may all be nationals as the case 
of South Africa, Uganda, Chile and Argentina or all foreigners like was in El Salvador or a mixture of 
both nationals and foreigners as was the case in Guatemala and Sierra Leone. 
92 Tomuschat (2001:238). 
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chairman of the commission has been questioned by the citizenry and the 
international community.
93
 
3.2.3  Confidence crisis facing TJRC 
Unfortunately, just as it was beginning its work in January 2010, the TJRC 
experienced a public confidence crisis. The first sessions of the Truth Commission 
were disrupted on two occasions by Civil, NGO’s and Human Rights activists.94 
Victims have also vowed not to appear before the Truth Commission as it is 
presently constituted.
95
 This crisis has affected Kenyans’ belief in transitional justice.  
3.2.3.1 Credibility of the Commission’s Chairman 
Allegations of bias and misconduct have been made against the Chairperson. The 
allegations about his role in the former Moi government have generated a widely-
held perception that he is in a conflict of interest situation and that he is unable to 
bring an impartial mind to bear on his important duties as TJRC Chairperson. A 
statutory Commission of Inquiry as well as a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry 
into the murder of Dr. Robert Ouko, a foreign affairs minister, made disturbing 
findings against Kiplagat on matters that fall squarely within the TJRC’s mandate. 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal and Irregular Allocation of 
Public Land (released in 2004) makes references to instances of the illegal 
acquisition of public land on the part of Kiplagat. The Report of the Parliamentary 
Committee of Inquiry into the Wagalla Massacre includes a report from an 
                                                            
93 Ongeyo (2010). 
94 Turay (2010). 
95 Ongeyo (2010). 
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investigation team which concluded that Mr. Kiplagat was untruthful in his 
submissions.
96
  
While Mr. Kiplagat has disputed the references to him in these reports, they 
nonetheless have a direct and serious impact on public perceptions in relation to his 
fitness to hold the high office in the Commission. Furthermore, the final make up of 
a truth Commission affects the appearance and reality of its independence and also 
that of the person serving as Commission’s president because he often becomes the 
public face of the Commission.
97
  
Protest against the TJRC Chairman erupted even before the Commissioners were 
sworn in. The Chairman was even constrained to go on television before being sworn 
in to defend the accusations against him.
98
The situation is deteriorating to the extent 
that even television talks now show that no sensible Kenyan is likely to believe in 
truth, justice or reconciliation delivered by processes such as the Truth Commission 
headed by a retired public officer, whose career apex coincides with the height of 
gross human rights violations, and who spent this part of his career publicly denying 
that such violations were occurring.
99
   
The Kenyan Human Rights Commission, a body charged with spearheading human 
rights in the country, threatened to call for mass action if Kiplagat would not have 
resigned within seven days for allegedly being answerable to historical injustices.
100
 
In addition the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) asked Kiplagat to 
resign over what it called, “his endangering the TJRC’s ability to deliver truth, 
                                                            
96 Minya and Kalekye (2010). 
97 Tomuschat (2001:226). 
98 Ongeyo (2010). 
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justice and accountability for past injustices and gross human rights violations." 
101
 
Moreover the Law Society of Kenya (the Kenyan bar association) also asked Mr. 
Kiplagat to resign saying that the resignation was about his moral integrity and 
dignity.
102
 Furthermore the former chairpersons and commissioners of truth 
commissions from around the world, also called upon Mr. Kiplagat, to step down 
from his positions as Chairperson and Commissioner of the TJRC saying that they 
we deeply troubled by the serious allegations of bias and misconduct made against 
the Chairperson Kiplagat.
103
Thereafter the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice also called upon the chairperson to resign.
104
 Earlier on the civil society had 
filed a case in court seeking for orders of prohibition to issue prohibiting Bethwel 
Kiplagat from running the affairs of TJRC and from participating in activities of 
TJRC and for orders of certiorari to quash the oath of office of Chairman and 
commissioner Kiplagat in August 2009.
105
 The case is still pending in court. 
 
 Subsequently, the Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister under whose portfolio 
the TJRC falls asked Parliament to disband the TJRC. The Minister expressed 
concerns that a year since its inception, the TJRC had not covered any ground and 
had thus failed in executing its mandate.
106
 Shortly thereafter, the vice-chairperson of 
                                                            
101 Mutua and Orengo (2010).  
102 Ngirahu (2010). 
103  The former chairpersons and commissioners included Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former 
chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Bishop Joseph Christian 
Humper, former chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone; and 
Salomon Lerner Febres, former chairperson of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
available at www.blog .marsgroupkenya.org (accessed 4 June 2010). 
104 Press release of 24 February 2010. 
105 Republic of Kenya v TJRC &Others, Ex-parte Augustine Njeru Kathangu and Others; 
Miscellaneous Application No. 470 of 2009. 
106 Omanga (2010). 
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the commission resigned, stating that her stay was becoming untenable.
107
 As at the 
time of writing this paper, the TJRC has not started its work. 
The TJRC Act sets out the procedures for the removal of the chairman or 
commissioner in section 17, which involves the formation of a tribunal to investigate 
the commissioner.
108
  
Kiplagat has however, stipulated that he will quit only after following the legal 
process.
109
 This therefore amounts to bad faith on part of Kiplagat because he has 
brought the TJRC to a standstill and its time is running. While it is impossible for the 
TJRC to please everyone, the language of reconciliation demands that the TJRC’s 
office-holders be held up to the same standards that the people it is created to serve 
deem appropriate.
110
 It would therefore be unfortunate for Kiplagat to allow himself 
to be subjected to the process of setting a tribunal to remove him from office instead 
of resigning amicably.   
3.2.4 Mandate of the TJRC  
The mandate of a commission defines its purpose, powers, and limitation. This is 
included in the commissions’ terms of reference which define a commission’s 
                                                            
107 Kariuki (2010). 
108 Section 17 of the TJRC ACT states that the chairperson or any other commissioner may be              
removed from office by the President; for misbehavior or misconduct, if convicted of an offence and i
mprisoned, if is unable to discharge the functions of his office because of physical or mental infirmity 
or if the chairperson or commissioner is absent from three consecutive meetings of the Commission 
without good cause.  
Sub section 2 provides that, where the question of the removal from office arises the Chief Justice 
shall, by notice in the Gazette, appoint a Tribunal which shall consist of a chairperson and two other 
members selected by the Chief Justice from among persons who hold or have held office as judges of 
the High Court to inquire into the matter and report on the facts to the Chief Justice and recommend 
whether the chairperson or the commissioner ought to be removed from office and 
the Chief Justice shall communicate the recommendations of the Tribunal to the President.   
109 Leftie and Namunane (2010). 
110 Bosire (2010). 
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investigatory powers; the time scope of the commission’s investigation and its life. 
The mandate also states when and to whom the final report must be submitted.
111
 
 
Truth commissions are obliged to fulfil their terms of reference. The mandate of 
some truth commissions have been explicit about what kind of abuses they were to 
investigate and document, but there have been others which provide only general 
guidance about the kind of abuses to be investigated.
112
 It therefore follows that the 
terms of reference of a commission can either limit or strengthen its investigative 
reach. For instance a number of the commissions have been mandated to look only 
into disappearances such as those in Argentina, Uruguay and Sri Lanka. Notably, 
such specific terms of reference make a commission exclude a significant portion of 
the truth. For instance, the Uruguayan Commission
113
 failed in achieving its 
objectives of auditing the past since the majority of the human rights violations that 
had taken place during the military regime, such as illegal detention and torture, 
which constituted a bulk of violations, were ignored. Similarly, Chilean Commission 
investigated disappearances, executions and torture leading to death,
114
 but its 
mandate prevented it from investigating incidents of torture that did not result in 
death. This has been criticized by international human rights observers.
115
 
The commissions which have had a more flexible mandate have been able to achieve 
their terms of reference. The El Salvadoran Commission had its mandate fairly open; 
indicating that the commission should report on serious acts of violence, whose 
impact on society the public ought to know the truth.
116
 The commission was thus 
                                                            
111 Buergenthal (2006:106). 
112 Hayner (2006:217).   
113 Report of the Uruguayan Investigative Commission on the situation of Disappeared people and its 
causes. 1985. 
114 Chile, Executive Branch Supreme Decree No 355. 
115 Hayner  (2006:115). 
116 From Madness to Hope: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 18. 
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not limited and it summarized the overall patterns of violence and reported fully on 
the abuses that took place over the twelve years of civil war.
117
 This was a great 
achievement for the El Salvadoran Truth Commission.
118
 
Even with a flexible mandate, a commission may fail to document certain widely 
experienced abuses, especially those suffered by women, such as sexual abuse.
119
 In 
South Africa for example, a very small number of cases of sexual abuse were 
brought to the commission, compared to the widespread practices of rape that were 
known to have taken place.
120
 However this underreporting is due to a number of 
factors. In many cultures, rape carries a huge social stigma, embarrassment and 
shame for the victim, and women are understandably uncomfortable giving 
testimony in public hearings and even in private hearings if the details would be 
published in a public report.
121
 Nevertheless, some commissions have written 
effectively on this subject. The Guatemalan report included a chapter that described 
testimonies of witnesses, incidents of gang rape and other wide- spread practices of 
extreme sexual violence against women.
122
 The El Salvadoran Commission chose 
not to mention in its report cases of rape, though the commission concluded that rape 
had taken place.
123
The Sierra Leonean Commission paid special attention to the 
subject of sexual abuse. It devoted a considerable attention to issues concerning 
women in the conflict. Many women gave statements to the commission and testified 
                                                            
117 Tomuschat(2001:239). 
118 Buergenthal(2006:106). 
119 Hayner(2006:12). 
120 Padarath(1998:64), where she writes that “while the sexual nature of prison torture is the focus of 
much attention, the sexual brutalization of women believed to be the supporters of opposing political 
parties has received very little emphasis or even acknowledgement”. 
121 The South African Commission describes this phenomenon in its report. See vol 4, chap.10, 
sec.36-43, 293-94. 
122 See Guatemalan: Memoria del Silencio, vol. 3, chap.2, par.49. 
123  The Report of Commission on the Truth for El Salvador lists many incidents of rape in its 
appendix, which documents all victims who provided testimony and the violations that they suffered. 
These rape victims clearly were considered to fall within the commission’s mandate. The Commission 
never explained this discrepancy in its policy. 
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during its hearings. Their statements were taken in closed sessions in the presence of 
women members and staff of the commission. But in the end the commission made 
no findings or recommendations on this point,
124
 except to urge the Sierra Leone 
government to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
125
 
Pursuant to section 5 of the TJRC Act, 
126
 the Kenyan commission is charged to:-
establish a record of abuses, nature and causes of human rights violations and 
economic rights inflicted on persons by the state, public institutions and holders of 
public office, between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008. It is also supposed 
to investigate violations of international human rights law and determine those 
responsible. In addition, it is empowered to investigate economic crimes and inquire 
into illegal and irregular acquisition of land. Further, it should inquire into the causes 
of political violence before and after elections and make recommendations on how to 
prevent future occurrences of such violence. It should also recommend prosecutions 
of the perpetrators of gross human rights as well as determine ways and means of 
redressing those violations. Moreover, it ought to facilitate the granting of 
conditional amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant acts 
associated with gross human rights violations and economic crimes. Finally, it 
should compile a comprehensive report of its findings with recommendations on 
how to prevent future human rights violations.
127
 
                                                            
124 Schabas (2006: 24). 
125 Article 5 (b) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa requires the prohibition “through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of 
female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalization and Para-medicalization of female genital 
mutilation and all other practices in order to eradicate them. 
126 Act No 6 of 2008. 
127 See section 5 of the TJRC Act. 
 
 
 
 
 33 
The Kenyan TJRC seems to be the first with such broad mandate. Remarkably, it is 
the first commission charged with the mandate of investigating economic crimes 
such as grand corruption and the exploitation of natural or public resources for 
private enrichment. It is also the first to inquire into irregular and illegal acquisition 
of public land with a purpose of making recommendations of repossessing such 
land. The commission has also been well mandated to investigate broadly on 
human rights violations and violations of international human rights law and abuses 
such as massacres, sexual violations, murder, extra-judicial killings, torture, 
political assassinations and disappearances and to include their causes, nature, 
antecedents, and perspective of victims and motives of persons responsible. 
This is commendable because for a truth commission to be effective, in providing 
the truth it is important that the most prevalent types of human rights violations be 
opened up for investigations. Furthermore, states have a duty to prosecute grave 
crimes against the life, physical integrity and freedom of human beings if such 
crimes have been committed in their respective territories.
128
 Moreover States have 
an obligation to find and make public the truth about human rights abuse. 
International human rights law obliges states to investigate and punish gross 
violators of human rights in most circumstances. This means that the citizen has a 
right to know the results of such investigations.
129
 This was reaffirmed by The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 1988 case of Velasquez Rodriguez.
130
 
 
                                                            
128 See Rome Statute, preamble (4) and (6).  
129 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which stipulates that there is indeed “a 
right to know the truth” which is contained within the right to seek, receive and impart information’. 
Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, provides for the right to receive 
information. 
130 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of 29 
July 1988; [Inter-Am.Ct.HR.(Ser.C) No.4(1988)]. 
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3.2.5 Time frame  
3.2.5.1 Duration of the Commission 
As a general rule, Truth commission should carry on for a minimum period of nine 
months and no longer than two and half years. It should have a deadline for 
completion.
131
 The commission’s mandate should also investigate human rights 
committed over a reasonable period to avoid overloading the commission. 
Section 20(1) of the TJRC Act provides that the commission shall be inaugurated 
within 21 days of the appointment of its members and shall operate for two years. 
Subject to subsection 2 of that section, the commission shall have a preparatory 
period of three months to undertake all tasks to ensure that it is able to work 
effectively from the commencement of its operations. 
The appropriate preparatory period of the commission depends on the political 
culture and circumstances of the country under consideration. The South African 
commission spent 18 months designing its work. This preparatory time was crucial 
to developing the commissions’ complex empowering legislation.132The Kenyan 
TJRC took four months for its preparatory work and started working in January 
2010. 
The TJRC has two years for collecting and organizing documentation, receiving 
and processing testimony from thousands of victims, completing investigations, 
and finishing a final report.  This is a tight time frame and it may be difficult given 
the wide mandate and period the commission is to cover. The investigations cover a 
total period of 45 years, stretching all the way back from 12 December 1963 to 28 
February 2008.  
                                                            
131 Hayner (2002:218). 
132 Hayner (1994:597. 
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A study of some of the commissions that have existed to date helps create doubts 
on the possibility of the Kenya TJRC completing its work within the stipulated 
time of two years, given the period it has to cover. For example, the Guatemalan 
Commission which was to cover a period of 34 years, took two years and the South 
African Commission covered the same period of time took five years. The German 
Truth  Commission which covered 40 years, took three years.
133
 
On the one hand, one must acknowledge an element of legitimacy in the strict 
limitation of time allotted to a truth commission. A time frame extending more than 
three years would eventually create boredom and make the citizenry lose interest 
and support in the commissions’ work. This has happened with the Ugandan 
commission which was set up in 1986 and took nine years and also with the South 
African Commission which was in place for 5 years.
134
 
3.2.5.2 Period covered by the TJRC investigations 
Investigating a period of 45 years would be difficult for the commission, as some 
of the witnesses, victims and survivors of gross violations of human rights could be 
dead or evidence may be destroyed or memories could have faded.  
Further it amounts to overburdening the TJRC and preventing it from discharging 
the mandate in a thorough manner. This was the dilemma facing the Commission in 
Guatemala which was supposed to investigate all the human rights violations 
committed during a period of 34 years. In the end, it reflected at length on the 
dilemma created by its terms of reference and identified itself with similar 
difficulties experienced by other truth commissions in particular the Chilean and 
the El Salvadoran commissions. Accordingly, it determined that it had to give 
                                                            
133 Hayner (2002: 223). 
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priority to attacks on life and personal integrity, in particular extrajudicial 
executions, forced disappearances and sexual violations.
135
 
Some of the cases to be investigated by the TJRC such as murder, grand corruption, 
and election violence, irregular and illegal acquisition of public land have been the 
subject of investigation in the past. The recommendations of these commissions of 
inquiry have never been implemented or made public.
136
  
It is in this context that, we would argue that the TJRC would have been properly 
mandated to enquire into the victims and survivors of the past injustices with an 
aim of offering compensation, instead of investigating that which is known to the 
citizenry. This would serve to acknowledge what many already know about the 
past and it would be important for national healing and reconciliation.  
3.2.6 Funding for the TJRC 
Full funding for a commission should be committed and must be available at the start 
of its work. This is particularly important if the commission is fully or largely funded 
by the state.
137
 
The Kenyan TJRC is being funded by the government and it is experiencing 
financial problems. The TJRC is yet to receive the US$ 26, 666, 666 it requested 
from the Justice Ministry in 2009. According to a brief released by the TJRC 
Communications Consultant, the request for the two-year operational budget was 
                                                            
135 See, Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification Report. 
136 See, Gichaba, (2008:9) Where he states that; The Kiliku Commission of inquiry into the land 
clashes of 1991/2 through 1997, more than 10 years later, Mr. Kiliku’s findings still on government 
shelves. The Elijah Mwangale Commission of inquiry investigated the murder of J.M Kariuki, and 
more than three commissions of inquiry have investigated the assassination of Dr. Robert Ouko. On 
the other hand, in non-murder cases, the best example would be the Goldenberg Commission of 
inquiry and the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal and Irregular allocation of Land, commonly 
known as Ndungu Commission.  
137 Hayner (2002:134). 
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submitted in December 2009 but there was no official response from the ministry. 
Commissioner Slye once stated in a press conference that TJRC had not received 
official communication as to what amount it is supposed to be getting and added that 
the commission was limited and was trying to seek funding from donors.
138
 
It has been common for truth commissions in the past to run short of funds and to 
struggle under a tight budget.  For instance, the South African commission which 
had US$18 million a year complained of insufficient funds. The Guatemalan and El 
Salvadoran Commissions also had inadequate funds. The Haitian commission ran 
into serious problems as well. Only Chilean commission had sufficient resources 
for the task and the government was willing to provide funding for it to complete 
its work successful.
139
 
3.2.7 Assignment of individual responsibility 
The mandate of a Commission can expressly empower it to name persons 
responsible for gross violations of human rights. Naming the perpetrators has been 
one of the most controversial issues facing truth commission. Some commissions 
such as, the Guatemalan and Chilean Commissions were not authorised to name 
individuals, while others, such as, the Rwandan, El-Salvadoran and the Chadian 
Commissions named the perpetrators.
140
  
The mandate of the TJRC has empowered it to name those responsible for the 
commission of the violations and abuses with an aim of prosecution.
141
 This is 
laudable as it grants the named individuals an opportunity to acknowledge their 
deeds and ask for forgiveness. Acknowledgement implies that the perpetrators have 
                                                            
138 Amran  (2010). 
139 Hayner (2002:216). 
140 Hayner (2002:216). 
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admitted their misdeeds and have recognized that they were wrong.
142
 Citizens also 
have the right to know the truth. Those who are meant to forgive must know what 
and whom they are forgiving. Truth has precedence over punishment. Punishment 
can be negotiated. The truth cannot. “There can be no reconciliation without the 
truth”.143 This was the approach adopted by the South Africa Commission. The truth 
promotes forgiveness which enables reconciliation thus healing of the nation. 
3.2.8 Proceedings before the TJRC 
Proceedings of a truth commission may be confidential or public. The Guatemalan 
and the El Salvadoran Commissions held their hearings privately whereas the South 
African and Sierra Leonean Commissions held public proceedings. It has been 
argued that public proceedings safeguard impartiality.
144
The Kenyan TJRC Act 
provides that the proceedings of the commission shall be public but the Commission 
may direct the proceedings to be held privately in any of the following instances, 
where; 
(a) the security of perpetrators, victims or witnesses is threatened;  
(b) it would be in the interests of justice or 
(c) there is a likelihood that harm may ensue to any person as a result of 
proceedings being open to the public; and 
(d) a victim, perpetrator or witness may apply to the Commission for 
proceedings to be held in camera. 
Where the Commission has directed that the proceedings shall be private the  inform
ation relating to those proceedings is also private.The Act has provisions ensuring     
                                                            
142  Neier (1990:31). 
143 Werle (1996:72). 
144 Hayner (2002:229). 
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that the dignity of the victims is up-held, for example,  the victims’ privacy and         
safety and that of  their families shall be protected. Victims shall also communicate 
in a language of their choice.
145
 
Despite these provisions, the measures included in the Act are insufficient to take 
into account the needs and rights of victims. The experiences of other truth 
commissions such as the Sierra Leonean and the South African Truth Commissions 
show that victims and witnesses, especially women, fear participating in the process 
that would put them at risk of reprisal, and need the truth commission to provide 
them with comprehensive and effective protection.
146
 The TJRC has a vaguely 
worded power to ensure that "appropriate measures" are taken for the victims' 
safety
147
 and in camera hearings. The Act does not include any provisions 
establishing comprehensive, long-term and effective protection measures for victims 
and witnesses. 
Kenya adopted a Witness Protection Act in 2006. The Act seeks to put in place 
measures for the protection of witnesses.
148
 But, it is not clear whether the provisions 
of the Witness Protection Act will regulate the protection of victims and witnesses 
giving statements to the Commission. 
3.2.9 Collection of evidence 
The commission has powers to gather, by any means it deems appropriate, any 
information it considers relevant to its cause. To this end it has powers to search, 
                                                            
145 See generally section 25 of the TJRC Act. 
146 Dumbuya (2003:37). 
147 Sec. 25(5). 
148 See the preamble to Kenyan Act No.6 of 2006.  
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enter any place without prior notice and take any property or documents 
which may be of assistance to the commission.
149
  
The Commission can interview any individual at its discretion. It can also compel a 
person to attend its session or hearing. Further, it can request information from the 
relevant authorities of a foreign country and gather information from victims, 
witnesses, government officials and others in foreign countries. In addition, it can 
issue summonses as it deems necessary in fulfilment of its mandate and request and 
receive police assistance as needed in the enforcement of its powers.  
These subpoena powers are similar to those vested with a court and are very vital 
for fulfilling its mandate. They are useful in a number of situations. For example a 
person with relevant information is summoned and compelled to disclose. To date, 
the following commissions have had subpoena powers: Uganda, Chad, South 
Africa, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.
150
  
Remarkably, the Kenyan TJRC is the only one so far in the history of truth 
commissions which has powers to request for information from foreign authorities 
and gather information from victims, witnesses and government officials in other 
countries. 
3.2.10 Amnesty provisions 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines amnesty as, “a sovereign act of oblivion for past 
acts, granted by a government to all persons …guilty of a crime …and often 
                                                            
149 Sec. 7 of  Kenyan TJRC Act. 
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conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed period”.151 
States grant amnesty to achieve peace and reconciliation.
152
 
 
Section 34 of the TJRC Act deals with amnesty. Under this section a person may 
make an application for amnesty in relation for a matter to be investigated under the 
Act and the commission may recommend granting of conditional amnesty. However 
no amnesty may be granted for genocide, crimes against humanity, gross violation of 
human rights or an act, omission or offence constituting a gross violation of human 
rights including extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearances, sexual assaults, 
rape and torture. 
 
Section 35 provides that a person who wishes to apply for amnesty will make an 
application in writing. The Commission may recommend amnesty if it is satisfied 
that the application complies with the requirements of the Act and that the applicant 
has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts.
153
 And where the commission has 
refused amnesty, it should as soon as is practicable notify the applicant.
154
 If amnesty 
is granted to any person in respect of any act, the Commission may order that person 
to compensate the victim of that act.
155
 
 
The prohibition of both conditional and unconditional amnesties for crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other gross human rights 
violations is commendable. The conditional amnesty process of the South African 
                                                            
151 Black’s Law Dictionary (2007:82-83). See also the case of Azania Peoples’ Org. V. President of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996(4) salr 671, 690,692(CC) (AZAPO case) and Prosecutor v Kallon, 
Kamara, Appeals Chamber Decision of 13 March 2004 on the Lome Accord Amnesty. 
152 AZAPO case and Dumbuya (2006:45). 
153 Sec. 38 of the Act. 
154 Sec. 40 of the TJRC Act. 
155 Sec. 41 of the TJRC Act.  
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Commission is now considered to be unacceptable under international law.
156
 The 
Sierra Leonean blanket amnesty was also considered to be ineffective as it violated 
international law.
157
 
3.2.11 Provisions relating to reparations 
Normally truth commissions help in designing a reparation program for victims of 
human rights violations. International law establishes an obligation on the part of the 
state to provide redress for human right abuses.
158
 This may take many forms that go 
beyond the payments of cash to the injured.  Reparation is a general term 
encompassing different types of redress including restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantee of non repetition.
159
 
 
The TJRC Act provides at section 41 that if amnesty is recommended to any person 
in respect of any act, the Commission may recommend reparation and rehabilitation 
of the victim of that act.
160
 Section 42 provides that “Any person who is of the 
opinion that he has suffered harm as a result of a gross violation of human rights may 
apply to the Commission for reparation in the prescribed form”.  Subsection 2 of 
that section provides that where the Commission is of the opinion that the applicant  
is a victim, it shall make recommendations in an endeavour to restore the human and 
civil dignity of that victim. 
However, the Act does not expressly state what form of reparation should be 
recommended. Therefore the Commission can emulate the Chilean Commission 
                                                            
156 “Concerns about the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill.” 
157 Prosecutor v Kallon, Kamara, Appeals Chamber Decision of 13 March 2004 on the Lome Accord 
Amnesty. 
158 United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Study concerning the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: Final Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/EC.4/Sub.2,1993, 8 July, 1993. 
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which recommended financial benefits to the victims, such as scholarships to the 
children of victims and survivors, medical insurance and monthly stipends to cover 
the cost of living and school supplies.
 161
 The South African Commission 
recommended detailed reparations program including financial, symbolic and 
community-based reparations.
 162
 In the circumstances, it would make sense to 
recommend community-based reparations such as building of schools, health centres 
or projects aimed at elevating poverty. It would be beneficial to victims if they could 
be supplied with water and electricity because many Kenyans lack these important 
utilities especially in rural areas. 
3.2.12 Implementation of the Commission’s report 
The TJRC ACT at sections 48 to 50
163
 includes provisions to guarantee the 
implementation of the Commission's recommendations. Such provisions are 
particularly important in the light of the experience of previous judicial and non-
                                                            
161  Details of the Chilean reparations program, and the total costs, are reported in Corporation 
Nacional de Reparacion Reconciliation,1996, 595-602.  
162 Hayner (2002:217). 
163 Section 48 of the TJRC Act provides that, the Commission shall submit a report of its work to the 
President at the end of its operations. The report shall summarize the findings of the Commission and 
make recommendations concerning reforms which could be legal, political, or administrative. The 
report shall also recommend prosecution and reparations for the victims. In addition the report shall  
make recommendations on the mechanism and framework for the implementation of its  
recommendations.  
After submitting the report to the President, the Commission shall publish the report in the Gazette 
and in such other publications as it may consider appropriate, and shall make copies of the report, or 
summaries thereof, widely available to the public in at least three local newspapers with wide 
circulation.,  
Thereafter, the Minister shall table the report in Parliament within twenty one days after its 
publication and shall, operationalise the implementation mechanism in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Commission. There shall also be an implementation committee which shall p
ublish the reports of the Government in the appropriate form and submit its own quarterly reports to 
the public evaluating the efforts of the Government inimplementing the recommendations of the        
Commission. 
The implementation of the report of the Commission shall commence within six months upon its 
publication and the Minister shall report to the National Assembly within three months of receipt of 
the report of the Commission, and twice a year thereafter, the progress of the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations. The section also provides that all the recommendations shall be 
implemented, and where the implementation of any recommendation has not been complied with, the 
National Assembly shall require the Minister to furnish it with reasons for non-implementation. 
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judicial commissions of inquiry in Kenya, whose recommendations have not been 
implemented. Therefore, efforts to address this broader problem of ensuring the 
implementation of the Commission's recommendations are welcomed. 
3.3. Conclusion 
Even though the TJRC has not started its work, it has effective provisions to enable it 
carry out its mandate. It has the wide mandate which includes the following:- 
investigating economic crimes:- illegal and irregular allocation of land;  human 
rights abuses; powers to make recommendations for institutional reforms; and an 
express power to name individuals responsible for human rights abuses with an aim 
of having them prosecuted. It has wide subpoena powers. Moreover, it is the first 
truth commission to have powers of providing a clear framework of ensuring the 
implementation of its report. Further, it has no powers to grant conditional or 
unconditional amnesties in relation to international crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, or war crimes. All these are commendable provisions.  
But the big question is whether the TJRC will play any role in post conflict Kenya 
especially in bringing the perpetrators of post-election violence of 2007 to justice? 
Will the TJRC bring an end to the culture of impunity in Kenya, especially in regard 
to prosecution of people responsible for human rights violations? Indisputable is the 
fact that the TJRC will be fundamental in creating a proper record of the past while 
stating the truth which has been elusive in Kenya for a long time. This in itself will 
be a form of reparation to the victims and survivors of human rights violations who 
have been desiring  to know the official truth for a long time. It is also indisputable 
that the TJRC has no prosecutorial powers, but can only recommend prosecutions. In 
this regard therefore, this paper submits that, Kenya has not been keen to bring the 
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perpetrators of the alleged crimes against humanity committed during the post-
election violence to book. 
Finally this paper argues that; the TJRC is a crucial body needed in Kenya for 
dealing with the historical injustices. However, since not all commissions with 
credibility challenges have recovered in the past, there is need to take seriously the 
credibility challenges levelled against the TJRC if it is to achieve any of its 
objectives. Kenya can draw lessons from TRC procedures in Liberia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Serbia which influenced the manner in which the TRCs were 
perceived. This paper submits that it is important to address the current credibility 
challenges by having a transparent replacement of the chairperson of the 
commission. In the end this will increase public and international support for the  
TJRC. This will eventually help the TJRC regain its moral authority as it executes its 
mandate.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROPRIO MOTU INTERVENTION OF THE ICC IN THE KENYAN 
SITUATION 
4.0 Introduction 
Over the last two years Kenya has faced a huge task of establishing an appropriate 
justice model for dealing with perpetrators of crimes against humanity committed in 
the country during the post-election violence in 2007. This has been particularly 
difficult for Kenya due to the culture of impunity and low public confidence in the 
judiciary.
164
 Initially the government tried and failed to establish the Special Tribunal 
for Kenya which would have tried those responsible for the violence as was 
recommended by the Waki Commission. 
165
 Following this failure the ICC 
Prosecutor sought the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate proprio motu 
investigations in Kenya.
166
 
The situation in Kenya is of great interest to international criminal justice and 
jurisprudence for various reasons. Firstly, this is the first time the ICC Prosecutor is 
invoking the powers conferred upon him under Article 15 to open proprio motu 
investigations into a situation occurring in a state party to the Rome Statute. 
Currently the other situations under ICC investigations and prosecution are “self- 
referrals”, and the situation in Darfur, Sudan (a non-States Party) which was referred 
by the United Nations Security Council. The determination of the Kenyan situation 
will set a precedent.
167
 
                                                            
164 “The ICC and post-election violence in Kenya.”  
165 Nicholas (2009). 
166  Prosecutor's Request, ICC-01/09-3, available at www.icc-cpi.int (accessed on 6 June 2010). 
167 Nicholas (2009). 
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Secondly, the Pre-Trial Chamber had the opportunity to clarify a number of 
contentious issues of international criminal law such as the principle of 
complementarity, the gravity threshold and the meaning of “interests of justice”.168 
Thirdly, this the first time the ICC will be intervening in a situation where a truth 
commission is also in existence. It will be interesting to see how these two bodies 
will function together. The question one would ask is this: can a non-prosecutorial 
mechanism conduct genuine investigations with the intent to bring the persons 
concerned to justice in order to keep the ICC at bay?
169
 
This chapter attempts to discuss Articles 15, 17, 20(3) and 53 of the Rome Statute 
with an aim of establishing whether the Kenyan situation was admissible before the 
ICC and the basis upon which  a  proprio motu intervention was authorised by the 
ICC. It will also seek to assess any role the ICC could have in Kenya. 
4.1.1 International Criminal Court 
 The Rome Statute of the ICC (hereafter the “Statute”) establishing the ICC came 
into force on 1 July 2002.
170
 The official seat of the Court is The Hague but its 
proceedings may take place anywhere.
171
 The Court began its work on 11 March 
2003.
172
 
The Statute has been described as a “major step forward for substantive international 
criminal law.” 173  Unlike the statutes of earlier international courts, such as the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
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170 Heller (2008). 
171 Article 3 of the Rome Statute. 
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Statute provides detailed definitions of the core 
international crimes, the possible modes of participation in those crimes, and the 
permissible grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. The Statute thus 
represents the international community’s most ambitious attempt to create a special 
and general part of international criminal law. 
The court is designed to complement existing national judicial systems. It can thus 
only exercise its jurisdiction when national courts are unwilling or unable to 
investigate or prosecute crimes committed in their territory.
174
 The preamble of the 
ICC affirms that it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
those responsible for international crimes.
175
 
 To date the Court has opened investigations into 5 situations: Northern Uganda; the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Central African Republic; Darfur (Sudan); 
and -Kenya. The Court has indicted 14 people; seven of whom remain fugitives, two 
have died (or are believed to have died), four are in custody, and one is appearing 
voluntarily before the court.
176
 
4.1.2 Jurisdiction of the ICC 
The ICC is a permanent tribunal for the prosecution of individuals for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
177
 The court will have jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression in the future.
178
 
                                                            
174 Article 11 and 20 of the Rome Statute. 
175 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute paragraph 6. 
176  See, “ICC situation and cases.” 
177 According to Article 5(1), 6, 7 and 8, this is known as jurisdiction rationae materiae. 
178 The Review Conference of the Rome Statute held at Kampala on 11 June 2010 amended the Rome 
Statute as to include a definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions under which the court 
would exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crime. The actual exercise of jurisdiction is subject to a 
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The jurisdiction of the ICC is restricted to crimes committed within the territory or 
by a national of either a states party or a state which has accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The Court therefore adopts the territoriality and active personality 
jurisdiction.
179
  
Nonetheless, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction regardless of the jurisdiction in 
which perpetrators find themselves when the UN Security Council refers a situation 
to it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Here, the UN acts to maintain peace since 
it can take authoritative action with regard to any UN member state. The UN 
Security Council exercised this power by referring to the Court the situation in 
Sudan, a non-member state of ICC, on 31 March 2005.
180
 
The ICC jurisdiction rationae temporis is restricted to crimes committed from 1 July 
2002 the date when the Statute entered into force.
181
 Special provision applies to 
states parties that acceded to the Statute afterwards.
182
 
4.1.3 Kenya and the Rome Statute 
Kenya ratified the Statute on 15 March 2005 and domesticated it in December 2008 
by enacting the International Crimes Act of 2008. The Act, however, entered into 
force on 1 January 2009 and therefore does not apply to the post-election violence 
crimes, as this would be in conflict with non-retrospectivity principle enshrined in 
the Constitution at the domestic level.
183
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the majority of state parties. See Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute. 
179 Werle(2009:84). 
180 U.N Resolution 1593,UN Doc.S/RES/1593(2005). 
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4.2 Proprio motu intervention of ICC in Kenya 
On 6 November 2009 the President of the ICC assigned the situation in Kenya to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber II. Consequently, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Moreno Ocampo, 
filed a request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC 
into the situation in Kenya in relation to the post election violence of 2007. In its 
judgment of 31 March 2010, The Pre-Trial Chamber II (hereafter the Chamber) gave 
the Prosecutor permission to lodge an investigation into the Kenyan situation.
 184
 The 
Chamber considered Article 15 and 53 of the Statute which regulate the procedures 
for initiating an investigation upon the Prosecutor’s own initiative subject to 
authorisation by the chamber.  
Article 15(1) provides that the Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu 
on crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.  Pursuant to Article 15(3), the 
Prosecutor must request authorisation of that investigation from the Chamber. Once 
such a request has been made, the Chamber shall, in accordance with Article 15(4), 
authorise the commencement of the investigation upon being satisfied that there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation and that the case appears to fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.   
Most important is Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It provides that 
in determining whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation 
under Article 15(3), the Prosecutor is required to consider the matters set out in 
Article 53(1), namely: 
(a)    Whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; 
                                                            
184 See the Decision pursuant to Article 15 of Rome Statute on the authorisation of an investigation 
into the situation in the Republic of Kenya on 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19 (hereinafter Judgement). 
 
 
 
 
 51 
(b)   Whether the case would be admissible under Article 17; and 
(c)    Whether, taking into account the interests of victims and the gravity of the 
crime, it would be in the interests of justice to proceed with an investigation. 
4.2.1 Reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the Jurisdiction of the 
court has been committed 
In its authorisation judgement the Chamber observed that the words “reasonable 
basis to proceed” referred to in article 15(3) and in the chapeau of article 53(1) are 
reiterated in article 53(1)(a) of the Statute. It therefore concluded that the "reasonable 
basis to believe" test set out in article 53(l)(a) of the Statute is subsumed by the 
"reasonable basis to proceed" standard referred to in the opening clause of article 
53(1) of the Statute, since the former is only one  element of the latter.  
Therefore, if upon review of the three elements embodied in article 53(l)(a) to (c) of 
the Statute and on the basis of the information provided, the Chamber reaches an 
affirmative finding as to their fulfilment, the "reasonable basis to proceed" standard 
will consequentially be met. 
In addition, the Chamber considered the meaning of the “reasonable basis to believe” 
and argued that it is one which requires the lowest evidentiary standard provided for 
in the Statute as it is confined to a preliminary examination of the information 
available to the Prosecutor, which may not be comprehensive. Accordingly, in 
evaluating the information provided by the Prosecutor the Chamber must be satisfied 
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that there exists a sensible or reasonable justification that a crime falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been committed.
185
 
In establishing whether a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court had been 
committed the Chamber stated that the crime had to satisfy the set conditions which 
were:  
(i) The crime had to fall within the category of crimes referred to in article 5 and 
defined in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the statute; 
(ii) It must fulfil the temporal requirements specified under article 11 of the 
statute; and 
(iii) It meets one of the two alternative requirements in article 12 of the statute.186 
In authorising the investigation in its decision of 31 March 2010, the Chamber 
agreed with the Prosecutor that there was reasonable basis to believe that crimes 
against humanity of murder, rape, deportation or forcible transfer of population and 
other inhumane acts were committed in Kenya and therefore the Courts material 
jurisdiction had been established. Furthermore, these crimes fell under the temporal 
jurisdiction of the Court since they occurred after the entry into force of the Statute 
in the Republic of Kenya. Finally, since the alleged crimes were committed on 
Kenyan territory, they fell within the Court's territorial jurisdiction.
187
  
                                                            
185 Judgement, para. 27 and 35. 
186 Judgement, para. 39 also Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, para. 36; Pre-Trial 
Chamber III,Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG, para. 12. 
187Judgement paragraph 70 also Prosecutors request, paragraphs 47, 48 and 49. 
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4.2.1.1 Contextual elements of the crimes against humanity 
As the alleged crimes were committed in Kenya two years after it ratified the Statute, 
the next issue that had to be determined by the Chamber was whether the alleged 
crimes amounted to crimes against humanity. 
The commission of the crimes against humanity require the commission of one of 
the individual acts described in article 7(1), which describes the contextual elements 
of crimes against humanity as follows, 
 “...Crimes against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack.” 
Article 7(2) (a) of the Statute further indicates that the: 
“attack directed against any civilian population' means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack”. 
The Prosecutor's request had alleged that the post-election violence of 2007-2008 
occurred in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the Kenyan 
civilian population, and that it comprised hundreds of incidents with varying degrees 
of organization.
188
 Eventually, the Chamber considered that the available 
information indicated that murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, forcible 
transfer of the population and other inhumane acts occurred on Kenyan territory 
within the time frame covered by the Prosecutor's Request.
189
 
 
                                                            
188 Prosecutors request para. 77 and 14. 
189 Judegement, para. 102. 
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4.2.2 Admissibility Test for a case under article 17 
Before exercising his proprio motu powers the Prosecutor must satisfy the Chamber 
that the case is admissible before the Court under article 17 of the Statute. In other 
words, the Court must be satisfied that the material elements of admissibility have 
been met. The question of admissibility mainly concerns the scenarios or conditions 
on the basis of which the Court shall refrain from exercising its recognized 
jurisdiction over a given situation or case. This is known as complementarity 
principle.
190
 The Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the Lubanga case,
191
 stated that the 
principle of complementarity is the “first part of the admissibility test”. 
4.2.2.1 Grounds for inadmissibility 
As a starting point, article 17 of the Statute presumes the admissibility of each case 
before the Court. Hence, a case becomes inadmissible when a ground for 
inadmissibility is proven. Article 17(1) regulates four different situations on 
inadmissibility. The first three relate to investigations and prosecutions by a state 
which has jurisdiction over a case, which can be distinguished on the basis of the 
measures a state has taken and how far the case has progressed on the national level.  
The primary consideration in this regard is whether the case is being investigated or 
prosecuted; whether the case has been investigated and whether the state decided not 
to prosecute the persons concerned or the persons concerned have been prosecuted. 
192
 The last inadmissibility situation is that “the case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the court”.193  
 
                                                            
190 The close relationship between the complementary principle and the admissibility test is explicitly 
recognised in article 17(1) with reference to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 1 of the Statute. 
191 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Pre-Trial Chamber decision of 29 January 2007. 
192 Article 17(1) (a), (b) and (c). 
193 Article 17(1) (d). 
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(a)  Current investigations or prosecutions; Article 17(1)(a) 
Once initial investigative steps have been taken, the case should be left to the 
national prosecution systems. The grounds for inadmissibility in this regard require 
two elements. First “investigations or prosecution”, and second “by a state which has 
jurisdiction over it”. A prosecution is to be understood as the opening and 
undertaking of a judicial criminal process by a state. Investigations by other bodies 
such as NGOs, do not qualify. Moreover the acting state must have jurisdiction over 
the case.
194
 
This therefore means that the Kenyan TJRC investigations cannot be deemed to be 
investigations for the purposes of Article 17(1)(a). 
(b) Case having been investigated and the State has decided not to 
prosecute: Article 17(1)(b). 
To fulfil the requirements of this ground, the case must have been investigated and a 
decision not to prosecute must have been taken. The use of the term “state” 
encompasses all state organs that can investigate ICC crimes and all such organs are 
in a position to take a decision not to prosecute. However, the investigating state and 
the one that took the decision not to prosecute must be one and the same. The 
investigations must also be completed and the decision not to prosecute must be 
final. This is to prevent the Court from running the risk of making a premature 
decision.
195
 
The notion “not to prosecute” also raises other questions such as the question of 
legitimacy. For example, it applies where a state adopts an amnesty law that bars 
                                                            
194 Kleffner and Kor (2004:117). 
195 Kleffner (2008:116). 
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initiation of an investigation and extends to cases already investigated, and it also 
includes the situation where prosecutorial authorities exercise their prosecutorial 
authority and decide not to prosecute. 
(c) Ne bis in idem; Articles 17 (1)(c) and 20(3)   
Article 17(1)(c) deals with cases which have already been decided and which thus 
have the effect of res judicata, whereas article 20(3) regulates the conditions under 
which a retrial by the ICC is permissible when a person has already been tried by 
another court. Article 20(1) provides that the Court is barred from trying a person 
with respect to conduct which has formed the basis of crimes for which the person 
has been acquitted or convicted by any another court. Also a prior trial by ICC bars a 
subsequent trial by another court.  
The above notwithstanding, the provisions of article 20(3) allow the Court to try a 
person again, if the proceedings in the other court were for the purposes of shielding 
the person concerned from criminal responsibility or were not conducted 
independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized 
by international law, or were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, 
was inconsistent with the intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
(d) Insufficient gravity, Article 17(1(d) 
A final ground for declaring a case inadmissible is where it is considered to be ”not 
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court”. The crimes must be 
sufficiently grave to justify further action by the Court. The early practice of the 
Court suggests that crimes are sufficiently grave only when the conduct in question 
is systematic or undertaken on a large scale, the perpetrator in question falls within 
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the category of most senior leaders in the state entity, and the person concerned falls 
within the category of those most responsible.
196
  
In its authorisation judgement the Court clarified this issue of gravity and stated that 
it requires both qualitative and quantitative approaches. This means that it is not the 
number of victims that matters but rather the existence of some aggravating or 
qualitative factors attached to the commission of the crime which makes it grave. 
The Court went on to state that, when considering the gravity of the crime, it ought 
to consider the scale of the alleged crimes (including an assessment of the 
geographical and temporal intensity), the nature of the unlawful behaviour or of the 
crimes allegedly committed, the means employed for the execution of the crimes, 
and the impact of the crimes and harm caused to victims and their families.
197
  
4.2.3 Was the Kenyan situation admissible before the ICC? 
The Kenyan situation raised many difficult questions on admissibility.  First, could it 
be said that a State is “willing” to prosecute when leaders of its government publicly 
support the trial of suspected perpetrators, but the government then fails to establish 
the necessary tribunal?  Secondly, how long is the Court expected to wait for 
domestic investigations and prosecutions to commence?  Finally, in the absence of 
any prosecutions, does the existence of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission make the Kenyan cases inadmissible under Article 17(1)(a)? 
A case becomes admissible before the Court if, first under article 17(1)(a) “the state 
is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigations or prosecution.” In 
the second situation, a case is admissible when the decision not to prosecute resulted 
                                                            
196 Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Decision of 10 February 2006 and the incorporation of documents into the 
case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo [42-63]. 
197Judgement, paragraph  67. 
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from the unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to prosecute, and in the 
third situation, where a person concerned has already been tried, the case is 
admissible on condition that the proceedings in the court “were for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
Courts’ jurisdiction, or where the proceedings were otherwise not conducted 
independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized 
by international law, and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, 
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” 198The 
fourth situation in which admissibility follows would be where the case is of such 
great gravity as to justify further action by the Court.
199
 
4.2.3.1 Unwillingness or inability to investigate or prosecute as a ground of 
admissibility 
Paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of Article 17 have the same exceptions: a case under 
investigations or prosecution is inadmissible “unless the state is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution”. Therefore, a case which has 
been investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it becomes 
admissible before the Court if the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution. Similarly, a case will be admissible before the Court 
if it has been investigated and the state concerned decided not to prosecute if the 
decision resulted from unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute. 
Both concepts; “unwilling and unable” are often confused and treated simply as one 
and the same although they are regulated separately as alternatives for the 
                                                            
198 Article 17(1) (c) in conjunction with Article 20 (3). 
199 Article 17(1) (d). 
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admissibility test.
200
 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 17 contain exhaustive legal 
definitions of both terms. According to Article 17(2), after having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law, a state would be unwilling 
to prosecute when one or more of the following situations exist: 
(a) ‘The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was 
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court; 
(b) There has been unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with intent to bring the persons concerned to justice; 
and  
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent to bring the person concerned to justice.” 
The reference to due process and the two forms of unwillingness spelled out in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) are similar to terms in Article 20(3)(a) and (b). Thus the 
following analysis applies to the latter provisions to the extent that they are identical.  
 (a) Shielding from criminal responsibility 
As regards the phrase “for purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court”, what needs to be said is 
this: first the use of the words ‘“for purpose of shielding” implies that the 
proceedings must specifically be directed at shielding from criminal responsibility. 
Secondly, the need to determine the purpose of proceedings, which in turn requires 
an inquiry into the state of mind of a state which raises the difficulty of determining 
                                                            
200 ICC Press Release “Communications received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC” of 16 
July 2003. 
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the mindset of an abstract entity such as a state. In the present context this may 
involve an appraisal of the intentions of those individuals acting as state organs such 
as investigators, prosecutors and judges as well as an evaluation of collective organ 
such as the legislative and the executive. In exceptional cases, purposes of shielding 
may be established due to express statements or manifested actions such as blanket 
amnesty following initial investigatory steps of the relevant national authorities.
201
 
The Court can also consider the sentence imposed in the trial. If the sentence does 
not reflect the gravity of the crime in question, it can be determined that the sentence 
was imposed for the purpose of shielding a person from criminal responsibility.
202
  
Nevertheless, when national courts of the same jurisdiction treat comparable cases 
very differently without any good reason, such differences may be indicative of an 
intention to shield from criminal responsibility.
203
   
Obviously the ICC must satisfy itself that the purpose of shielding from criminal 
responsibility manifests in investigations or prosecutions which can effectively be 
prevented by subsequent proceedings before the ICC.  
In this regard therefore, it is submitted that by establishing the TJRC which is a non-
prosecutorial body, the government of Kenya had the intention of shielding the 
perpetrators of post-election violence from criminal responsibility. Why else, would 
the government establish the TJRC unanimously and fail to pass the required 
legislation to establish the Special Tribunal for Kenya? 
 
                                                            
201 Kleffner (2008: 136). 
202 Olasolo (2006:52). 
203 Kleffner (2008:137).  
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(b) Unjustified delay inconsistent with intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice 
In order for cases to be admissible before the Court, they must meet a threefold test: 
there must not only be a delay in the proceedings, but such a delay has to be 
unjustified and such unjustified delay ought to be inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice. 
204
 Therefore Article 17 2(b) seems to suggest that 
no unjustified delays may occur, regardless of whether the proceedings are of an 
investigative, prosecutorial, trial, appellate, or any other nature, and that all stages of 
the proceedings have to be conducted expeditiously.   
This provision can be traced to the jurisprudence established by human rights 
conventions on the right to be tried without undue delay
205
 and to a hearing within a 
reasonable time
206
 as well as to a hearing by an impartial and independent tribunal.
207
 
In practice when interpreting these human rights norms, one has to consider whether 
the delay is justified. This entails considering such matters as the legal and factual 
complexity of the case. But economic and administrative restraints cannot justify a 
delay.  
But Article 17 2(b) concerns itself with unjustified delays which are inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice, which the prosecutor must 
establish for the case to be admissible before the Court.  
Thus the Kenyan situation became admissible before the Court since the delay in 
proceedings against the perpetrators of the post-election violence was left in limbo 
                                                            
204 Kleffner (2008:140). 
205 Article 14 3 (c) ICCPR. 
206 Article 6 (1) ECHR, 8(I) IACHR, 7 (1) (d) AFCHPR. 
207 Article 8 (1) AFCHPR. 
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for approximately two years without any indication as to whether they would be 
tried.  
(c) Lack of independence or impartiality  
A case becomes admissible under Article 17 2 (c) and 20 3(b) when proceedings 
were not conducted independently or impartially and were conducted in a manner 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the persons concerned to justice. Proceedings are 
impartial when they are not biased and are independent when the trial judges are not 
subject to improper influence from executive, legislature as well as other parties. 
208
 
4.2.3.2 Inability  
Inability is defined in Article 17(3) as a situation in which “due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings”.  
Here a state would be willing to prosecute but cannot do so because of the total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of a national judicial system. The state is 
simply unable genuinely to carry out the proceedings. A judicial system is 
unavailable when it is non-existent. A state is unable genuinely to prosecute when its 
justice system has substantially collapsed. This is the case when its deficiencies are 
irremediable and, as a whole, it does not function as a system anymore. Thus it can 
be referred as a failed state. If the collapse is temporal the requirements for this 
exception are not fulfilled and the case is inadmissible before the Court. 
                                                            
208 Kleffner (2008:123). 
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4.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, under international criminal law, the state has the primary 
responsibility for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing mass atrocities that take 
place within its territory.
209
 Paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute affirms that “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures 
at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation”.210 Thus the Statute 
spells out the object of the Court as being effective prosecution, whereas it 
underlines that measures for prosecution at national level must be enhanced since not 
all crimes can be prosecuted before the Court. Consequently the Kenyan 
Government has a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity committed in its 
territory.  
There have been no initial investigative steps that were taken in Kenya, such as 
establishing an investigative unit, securing the site where the crimes against 
humanity were allegedly committed and collecting evidence; nor has any prosecution 
with an aim of bringing the perpetrators to justice been undertaken. Again, the 
Kenyan justice system could not be regarded as having substantially collapsed 
because of the lack of the machinery to carry out investigations and prosecutions. 
The fact of the matter is that; its judiciary, police force and all the three arms of 
government were working. This does not fit into the category of not being able to 
genuinely investigate. Kenya is therefore a clear example of a state that is unwilling 
to investigate or prosecute. 
                                                            
209 Preamble to the Rome Statute, paragraph 6. 
210 Preamble to the Rome Statute, paragraph 4. 
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Lastly, Paragraph 5 of the preamble states that the object of “effective prosecution” 
is to end impunity and thus to contribute to prevention of crimes.
211
 This goal would 
be undermined in if cases that are admissible to the Court are left unprosecuted by 
the court when the respective state remains inactive. At the end, this would be a way 
of fostering impunity. The Kenyan TJRC was established to carry out investigations 
on historical injustices in Kenya (which has been discussed in chapter two of this 
paper) with an aim of recommending prosecutions for the persons found responsible.  
It is submitted that this is just another way of fostering impunity as it would delay 
prosecutions of crimes against humanity. It also shows that Kenya was unwilling to 
prosecute. Now that the government has failed or delayed unduly in establishing the 
Special Tribunal for Kenya. The Court’s intervention was proper since its 
involvement is expected only where a states party to the Rome Statute is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute and punish international crimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
211 Preamble to the Rome Statute Paragraph 5. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper has so far analysed the factual background leading to the intervention of 
the ICC and the establishment of the TJRC in Kenya. It has also studied the specific 
features of the TJRC and the grounds that made the Kenyan situation admissible to 
the ICC. In conclusion therefore, the paper will tackle two elements, namely; the 
intervention of the ICC where a TJRC exists and the relationship between TJRC and 
the ICC. To this end, we shall study the TJRC in relation to admissibility test for the 
ICC and secondly any role that both bodies can have in the transitional Kenyan 
society. 
5.1 Intervention of ICC where TJRC exists 
International criminal law has traditionally been concerned with governing relations 
between states. However, this perception changed with the advent of the 
International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, when individuals became 
subject of international criminal law when the tribunal stated that individuals could 
be held responsible for crimes against international law and could be punished 
accordingly since crimes against international law are committed by men and not by 
abstract bodies.
212
 This observation was important as it provided a platform for the 
development of international criminal law as it ensures that individuals are held 
responsible for serious violations and the desire of the state to bring such individuals 
to justice.  
                                                            
212 Principle 1 of the Nuremberg Principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgement of the Tribunal, Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of 
its second session(5 June-29 July 1950), UN Doc. A/316, in Yearbook of International Law 
Commission 1950 II, 374. 
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However, many states, including Kenya are not willing to participate in this process 
which subjects them to greater accountability. Article 17 of the Rome Statute makes 
states accountable at a local level by acknowledging that states bear the primary 
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting international crimes committed 
within their territory. This means that a state must incorporate laws to establish 
criminal liability at a national level for crimes ordinarily within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. This is what has been referred to as the principle of complementarity. If a 
state does not investigate and prosecute, it may invite the attention of the ICC as it 
may indicate unwillingness or inability to prosecute. The state should be able to 
genuinely carry out investigations or prosecution. A state is therefore able to forego 
the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC if it can actually fulfil its obligations to 
punish the perpetrators of international crimes.  
Regarding the intervention of the ICC where a truth commission exists, this paper 
argues that: the ICC should not interfere with a states’ process of dealing with the 
past as long as it does not cause a violation of human rights. Thus, the Kenyan case 
became admissible before the ICC since the government choose to institute the TJRC 
whose ability to perform its mandate as it is currently composed is questionable. 
Besides, the TJRC is a non-prosecutorial body. And,  Kenya being a state party to 
the ICC has a duty to punish those responsible for international crimes. The Waki 
Commission which investigated the post-election violence reported that crimes 
against humanity were committed in Kenya. It called upon the government to 
establish a proper criminal body such as the Special Tribunal for Kenya to try those 
who bore the highest criminal responsibility or refer the situation to the ICC. That 
notwithstanding, the government choose to establish the TJRC at the option of a 
criminal process. 
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This paper does not however question the establishment of the TJRC since Truth 
commissions have become bodies which are highly respectable as they are a useful 
platforms established at national level to deal with the past. What the paper questions 
is the act of its establishment over and against the criminal process in Kenya. This 
shows that the Kenyan government acted in bad faith as a state party to the Rome 
Statute and without recourse to her duty to investigate and prosecute those 
responsible for crimes against humanity allegedly committed in her territory.   
Moreover, it is a well recognized international law principle that states have a legal 
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means 
at its disposal to carry out serious investigations of violations of human rights 
committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose the 
appropriate punishment and ensure the victims adequate compensation.
213
 When 
Kenya adopted the option of a truth commission as the first step of dealing with 
human rights violations, it clearly indicated unwillingness to investigate and 
prosecute those responsible; thus making the situation admissible before the court 
under Art 17(3). 
This paper cannot underestimate the work of the TJRC; but it simply asserts that, the 
TJRC cannot replace criminal prosecutions. Nonetheless, TJRC complement 
criminal justice by contributing to a clarification of the historical background, and it 
is necessary and indispensable for a state in dealing with past violations of human 
rights. The ICC should carry out its operations in a way which minimizes 
interference with the work of truth commission.  
                                                            
213 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter American Court Judgment of 29th July 1988, HRL 9 212. 
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Now that the ICC investigations are ongoing in Kenya, and that there is a TJRC in 
existence, this paper recommends that the two bodies should not exclude each other 
but rather function complementarily.  
5.2 Does the TRJC and the ICC have any role in Kenya? 
For Kenya to foster reconciliation and healing, it is essential that the truth of the past 
be officially established. As Prof. Werle observes, there can be no reconciliation 
without truth.
214
 Furthermore, it is the right of the citizen to know the truth. 
Normally, the citizenry know what abuses happened and who did what, thus the 
TJRC will serve as a way of acknowledging the evasive truth officially. At the end, 
the TJRC would serve as an avenue of healing and reconciliation which is needed in 
the fractured Kenya society.   
But, that notwithstanding, there is also need to figure out, what would be done with 
the perpetrators of the crimes against humanity, since Kenya has a duty to prosecute 
those who bear the highest criminal responsibility. 
The intervention of the ICC in Kenyan situation must be viewed against the 
backdrop of the failure of the Kenyan government to establish the Special tribunal 
for Kenya. It therefore became evident that a solution was necessary to punish the 
perpetrators as the preamble of the ICC puts it “the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished…” The solution was 
therefore the proprio motu intervention by the ICC Prosecutor. The ICC thus will 
have the role of punishing those who are most responsible, a role which the 
government avoided. 
                                                            
214 Werle (1996:72). 
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The subject matter jurisdiction of the TJRC overlaps with that of ICC. The ICC is 
limited to crimes against humanity committed in Kenya from June 2005 to 31 March 
2010, when authorisation was granted, whereas the TJRC can investigate all human 
rights violations between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008. This therefore 
puts the human rights violations committed during the post-election violence within 
the TJRC mandate. Notably, the TJRC has the mandate to recommend prosecution of 
the perpetrators of human rights violations, this paper therefore argues that the TJRC 
is better placed to recommend prosecution at national level of those who would not 
be prosecuted by the ICC as the ICC prosecutes  only those who bear the highest 
criminal responsibility. 
Since prosecution of all perpetrators by the ICC is impossible, this paper submits that 
it would be credible to establish a local mechanism which would try the backlog of 
those not tried by the ICC and the ones recommended by the TJRC. This would 
serve to illustrate the complementary nature of the two bodies. And it would be 
precedent-setting as this is the first time these two bodies are existing concurrently. 
At the international level, reconciliation and prosecution are in most situations 
pursued separately, as was the case in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. It has, however, 
been argued that being far and remote from the local people, especially the victims 
and survivors, these prosecutions are unlikely to produce lasting peace to deter the 
commission of future crimes.
215
 Because of this criticism, the ICC has almost been 
physically involved in Kenya. For instance, the Prosecutor has been to Kenya twice 
within one year and another visit has been scheduled before the end of the year 2010. 
Secondly, the Registrar of the Court has also been in Kenya as a way of following up 
on investigations. Lastly, the ICC is also setting up a local registry in Kenya. All 
                                                            
215 Monshipouri and Welch (2001:389). 
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these activities are ways of showing concern of the Court for Kenyan situation, and 
this has been very important as the people of Kenya feel part of the process.  
While, post-conflict TJRC investigations and criminal trials for international crimes 
have similar aims, they approach these goals differently. On the one hand, TJRC 
aims at reconciling a deeply divided society; on the other hand, the primary objective 
of the ICC is to put an end to crimes by prosecuting those responsible. To this end, 
both bodies serve a deterrent function. 
In the light of the foregoing, this paper argues that the two bodies have the role of 
ending the culture of impunity in Kenya, which the Prosecutor seems to be keen on 
achieving. Impunity has been used in Kenya to protect the perpetrators of human 
rights violations. This, therefore, provides the foundation for the ICC to become a 
truly meaningful enforcement mechanism at both international and national level. 
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